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Abstract
We develop a model that allows for a comparison of past and
present corporate leniency programs for cartel behavior as enacted
e.g. in the USA and the EU. In particular, we analyze whether ﬁne
reductions should be independent of the amount of evidence provided
by self-reporting cartels (as it is the case in the US leniency program
and the new EU program enacted in 2002) or whether ﬁnes should de-
pend on evidence provision (as in the old EU program). We ﬁnd that
only ﬁrms which provide the (relatively) highest amount of evidence
should be granted a substantial ﬁne reduction. We derive suﬃcient
conditions for the optimality and sub-optimality of a full amnesty for
this ﬁrm. Firms with lower evidence provision should only be in-
diﬀerent between self-reporting and facing an expected ﬁne due to
self-reporting of the high evidence provider. We use these results to
review recent developments in the design of leniency programs.
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11 Introduction
In February 2002, the Commission of the European Union has substantially
revised its corporate leniency program for cartel prosecution from 1996. Al-
though there are still some diﬀerences, the new legislation is much closer
to the US program originally enacted already in 1978 and revised in 1993.
In particular, the EU program now also grants full immunity for ﬁrst self-
reporters if some basic requirements are fulﬁlled.1 By contrast, the program
valid until 2002 usually granted only partial immunity even to a ﬁrst self-
reporter, and the ﬁne reduction was dependent on the amount of evidence
provided to convict other cartel members. Our paper focuses on this institu-
tional change and analyzes the pros and cons of full amnesties vs evidence-
dependent ﬁne reductions. Hence, we compare the old European program
on the one hand to the US program and the new European program on the
other hand.2
In our model, two ﬁrms form a cartel whenever the expected (aggregated) in-
crease in proﬁts is above expected ﬁnes. Our model has inﬁnite time horizon,
and the cartel yields a social loss (i.e., a reduction of the sum of consumer- and
producer surplus in each period). The authority seeks to minimize this loss
by choosing the ﬁne reduction for the ﬁrst self-reporting ﬁrm in an optimal
way. To elicit the optimal dependence on the amount of provided evidence,
we assume that ﬁrms are heterogenous (i.e., that the conviction probabilities
for the two ﬁrms diﬀer in case the other ﬁrm self-reports). Moreover, we as-
sume that there will be a shock to cartel proﬁts (or the respective detection
probability) after the cartel has been formed. Hence, ﬁrms are more un-
certain about cartel proﬁts when deciding upon cartel formation than when
deciding upon self-reporting.
The resolution of uncertainty leads to an option value of self-reporting as
cartels will only be self-reported if proﬁts turn out to be (”surprisingly”)
small. This option value leads to the following trade-oﬀ for the: on the
1For instance, the applying ﬁrm must not be the leader or initiator of the cartel and car-
tel involvement must be terminated instantaneously. For details see European Community
(2002) and US Department of Justice (2004).
2The main diﬀerences between the new European program and the US program are (i)
that no ﬁne reduction for subsequent self-reporters is granted under the US program while
ﬁne reductions between 20 and 50% apply under the EU program, and (ii) that no ﬁne
reduction is granted in the US if investigators have already collected suﬃcient evidence
while a reduction between 20 and 50% is still possible in Europe. We discuss our ﬁndings
with respect to these institutional diﬀerences in a concluding section.
2one hand, high ﬁne reductions set high incentives to self-report, thereby
terminating the socially detrimental cartel. On the other hand, higher ﬁne
reductions enhance the option value of self-reporting and thereby increase
the expected proﬁt from forming a cartel in the ﬁrst place. Analyzing this
trade-oﬀ, we ﬁnd the following results:
First, and most important, it is never optimal to grant full immunity to a self-
reporter who can only provide little evidence on other ﬁrms. It turns out that
the high-evidence provider is pivotal for cartel continuation since his incentive
to self-report will be higher in the authority’s optimal policy. It follows that
the authority can choose a higher ﬁne for the low-evidence provider without
aﬀecting the overall probability of self-reporting. And since this higher ﬁne
increases the expected aggregated ﬁnes for the whole cartel, deterrence will
be higher than with full amnesty but the number of self-reported cartels will
not be reduced. The robustness of this ﬁnding lends some support to the old
program in the EU.
Second, the optimal self-reporting ﬁne for the ﬁrm which provides low evi-
dence can be characterized very easily - the ﬁne should equal the expected
ﬁne the ﬁrm faces in case the other ﬁrm self-reports. Hence, the ﬁne for one
ﬁrm depends on the evidence provided by the other ﬁrm.
Third, we investigate whether a full amnesty should be granted for the ﬁrm
providing the highest amount of evidence. With respect to this, our results
are more subtle as they depend on the probability distribution over the shocks
for cartel proﬁts. Intuitively, the larger the number of cartels with small (neg-
ative) proﬁt shocks (i.e., the larger the number of additional self-reporters in
case of a full amnesty) and the smaller the number of cartels with large (neg-
ative) proﬁt shocks (i.e., the smaller the number of overall self-reporters),
the more likely a full amnesty for the high evidence provider is optimal. The
larger the number of additional self-reporters, the more cartels become in-
stable due to a full for the high-evidence provider. The lower the number
of overall self-reporters, the less important is the pro-collusive impact of a
lower ﬁne for those who self-report. We show that a full amnesty for the high
evidence provider is optimal if the cumulative distribution function of shocks
to cartel proﬁts is convex.
Summing up, our model allows for a characterization of optimal ﬁne reduc-
tions and suggests their dependence on the amount of evidence provided by
the ﬁrms.
The basic idea that rewarding self-reporters in criminal teams can increase
deterrence is a simple application of the prisoners’ dilemma and has been
3conﬁrmed in many diﬀerent contexts. Kofman and Lawarr´ ee (1996) ana-
lyze double auditing for ﬁnancial statements and show that high rewards if
exactly one auditor is honest eliminate the incentives to collude with the
auditee. Garoupa (1999) assumes that arrested members of a criminal team
can compromise the whole organization and shows when ﬁne reductions are
welfare improving. Feess and Walzl (2004) assume that criminal teams may
either act in concert or non-cooperatively when deciding about self-reporting
and ﬁnd that the optimal ﬁne reduction does not depend on the probabil-
ity that team members behave cooperatively as long as this probability is
exogenous.
In recent years, a growing literature on the formal analysis of corporate le-
niency programs has emerged.3 As in our framework, Motta and Polo (2003)
consider an inﬁnitely repeated collusion game between ﬁrms. Collusion may
break down since partners may cheat on each other, for instance by setting
lower prices than agreed upon. Self-reporting schemes may then even en-
hance the stability of cartels, because low ﬁnes provide credible threats to
disclose the cartel in case the partner cheats. However, they also show that
the optimal leniency programs (weakly) improves social welfare.
Spagnolo (2004) also assumes that partners can cheat on each other and
shows that a ”courageous” leniency program that rewards the ﬁrst reporting
party with the ﬁnes paid by all other parties achieves a ﬁrst-best.4 In con-
trast, any ”moderate” program that reduces or cancels ﬁnes runs the risk to
provide credible threats for cartel members to unravel the deal in case the
accomplice cheats. In a similar spirit, Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2005) show
that rewarding whistle-blowers and allowing for imprisonment reduces the
maximum sanction required to trigger self-reporting.
Whereas Motta and Polo (2003) and Spagnolo (2003) thus focus on environ-
ments where team members may cheat on each other, other papers assume
that the members of a cartel either stick to the collusion or report to the
agency. Harrington (2005a) characterizes optimal leniency programs when
cartels have diﬀerent detection probabilities learned after an investigation has
started. As in our paper, the up-date of the team-speciﬁc detection prob-
ability creates an option value of self-reporting that reduces the deterrence
eﬀect of leniency programs. Since confession by one participant is always
3For an extensive overview on the theoretical literature see Spagnolo (2006).
4In the US, already convicted ﬁrms may in fact be subsidized for confessing cartels in
other markets that have not been detected yet (called ”amnesty plus”). See e.g. McElwee
(2004).
4suﬃcient to convict all members of the cartel, our question of ﬁne reductions
contingent on the amount of evidence provided does not arise in this context.
Aubert et al. (2005) investigate the agency problem associated with a whistle-
blowing program where employees are rewarded if they transmit evidence
about their employer’s cartel activity. Moreover, they regard hard evidence
as a threat to other cartel members and use this to explain why ﬁrms do
not destroy hard evidence for cartel activity. The amount of evidence that
can be provided in case of detection or self-reporting is therefore endoge-
nous. However, since all ﬁrms are identical with respect to their costs and
revenues, they all hold the same amount of evidence in equilibrium. Our
assumption of ﬁrms which diﬀer with respect to the amount of evidence they
keep could easily be derived in their model by allowing for heterogenous ﬁrms
(i.e., diﬀerent production costs or horizontal diﬀerentiation).
As usual in the literature on leniency programs, we assume that he proba-
bility that a cartel is detected depends only on the authority’s eﬀort.5 In
reality, however, the detection probability will also depend on the mark-up
agreed upon, and more generally speaking on the dynamics of the price path.
This has been considered in Harrington (2004), Harrington (2005b) and in
Harrington and Chen (2005). Whereas the two former paper operate with
(reasonable) ad-hoc assumptions concerning the inﬂuence of the price path
on the detection probability, the latter explicitly formalizes the believes of
industrial buyers who may inform cartel authorities that something is going
wrong, and analyzes the cartel’s reaction to these belief formations.
Hinloopen (2006) assumes that the authority can divide its limited resources
between diﬀerent cartels and ﬁnds that all industries should at least face
positive detection probability. Hence, bundling resources for industries that
are more likely to form cartels does not pay oﬀ. Festerling (2005) ﬁnds that
leniency programs on the corporate level are likely to be more eﬀective in
deterring cartel formation compared to leniency programs for managers.
Finally, a few empirical and experimental papers deal with the consequences
of corporate leniency programs. Connor (2007) demonstrates that the du-
ration of collusion has only a small impact on the ﬁne reduction actually
granted by the Department of Justice in the USA and argues that this re-
duces the positive welfare eﬀects of the program. Direct measurements of
5Here, we assume that this probability is exogenously given. In an older version of this
paper, we have also analyzed a model where this probability is endogenous, which did not
oﬀer additional insights.
5the deterrence eﬀect of leniency programs, however, is impossible since in-
formation about non-detected cartels is not available. Miller (2007) tries to
overcome this problem by assuming that discovered cartels are representa-
tive for all cartels, and then ﬁnds that the US leniency program has lead to
a reduction in cartel formation of about 50%. Apesteguia, Dufwenberg and
Selten (2006) and Hinloopen and Soetevent (2006) have carried out experi-
mental studies. Their approaches diﬀer with respect to the number of cartel
members and in the communication structure, but the bottom line of both
studies is a price reduction due to the introduction of leniency programs -
lending some support to the most robust result of the various theoretical
contributions.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present
the model and the timing of the game. We analyze the game by backwards
induction in Section 3. In particular, Section 3.4 contains a characterization
of the authority’s optimal policy. We conclude with some remarks on the
robustness of our ﬁndings and a respective critique of current policy designs
in Section 4.
2 The Model
In our model, there are two proﬁt maximizing risk-neutral ﬁrms and an
authority minimizing the expected social loss from cartel formation. The
game has inﬁnite horizon and ﬁrms discount time with discount factor δ.
In each period, a cartel is detected with probability pG, and the maximum
ﬁne on a convicted cartel member is s. The authority’s choice parameter is
the ﬁne reduction granted for a self-reporting ﬁrm. The ﬁne reduction may
depend on the amount of evidence provided in case of self-reporting (see
below).
Firms are ex ante symmetric and have a private beneﬁt B ∈ [0,B] from
cartel behavior in each period. B is distributed with density f(B) and has
full support. For simplicity, we assume that the beneﬁts within a cartel are
perfectly correlated and hence identical.6 To avoid trivial results we assume
B > pGs as cartels would otherwise never be formed.
After ﬁrms have formed a cartel, a shock to cartel proﬁts θ ∈ [0,1] dis-
tributed with density g(θ) occurs, leading to cartel proﬁts of θB in each
6Assuming independently distributed beneﬁts is more tedious but has no qualitative
impact on our results.
6subsequent period. This expresses the realistic assumption that ﬁrms do not
perfectly know their beneﬁt from cartel behavior in advance. In particular,
the assumption ensures the existence of cartels that subsequently self-report.
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Firms diﬀer with respect to the amount of evidence they can provide in case
of self-reporting, and we assume that this amount is also only learned after
cartel formation. Speciﬁcally, we assume that there is a ﬁrm H holding a
large amount of evidence and a ﬁrm L holding a small amount of evidence.
If ﬁrm F ∈ {L,H} self-reports, the other cartel member will be convicted
with probability
pCF = pG + pF − pGpF, F = H,L. (1)
with 1 > pH > pL > 0. pF denotes the probability with which the other ﬁrm
will be convicted on the basis of ﬁrm F’s report and pCF is the overall prob-
ability of conviction if ﬁrm F self-reports. Hence, the conviction probability
is always higher if the partner self-reports, but ﬁrm L is more likely to be
convicted if ﬁrm H self-reports (because pH > pL). Before cartel formation,
each ﬁrm expects to be each of the two types with probability 1/2, so that
the two ﬁrms are indeed identical ex ante.8
To allow ﬁnes to depend on evidence provision we denote the self-reporting
ﬁne for ﬁrm F as
rF = λ(1 − µpF)s (2)
where λ ∈ [0,1]9 depicts the overall size of the ﬁne reduction, and µ ∈ [0,1]
captures the impact of evidence. λ = 0 expresses an amnesty, and µ = 0 are
ﬁne reductions independent of the amount of evidence provided. Thus, the
lower λ the higher is ceteris paribus the ﬁne reduction, and the higher µ, the
more important is evidence provision. Note that the deﬁnition of rF implies
that the ﬁne is non-increasing in the amount of evidence provided (rH ≤ rL)
7Of course, the uncertainty could also refer to other aspects of the cartel like the
detection probability or preferences for not cheating on a ”partner”. Restricting attention
to negative shocks is thereby without loss of generality.
8To see that this is without loss of generality, assume that ﬁrms know their type ex ante.
Then, the incentive of the L-ﬁrm to form a cartel is lower as it can more easily be convicted
if the partner self-reports. With side payments, nothing would change. Without side
payments, ﬁrm L will be pivotal for cartel formation. Qualitatively, our results regarding
optimal evidence dependence of ﬁnes will stay the same.
9Of course, the model could be extended to ”courageous” leniency programs by admit-
ting λ < 0. However, in this paper we aim at a discussion of existing schemes, which all
exhibit λ ≥ 0.
7which holds in all leniency programs we are aware of, and which would also
occur endogenously in our model.
If both ﬁrms decide to self-report, each of them wins the ”race to the court-
room” with probability 1/2 and pays rF whereas the other ﬁrm pays s if
it is convicted (i.e., with probability pCF). Modelling a simultaneous self-
reporting decision as a race to the courtroom is often realistic, but our re-
sults would not change qualitatively if we assumed instead that a second
self-reporter gets also a ﬁne reduction.
The timing of the game can now be summarized as follows:
1. Authority commits to policy Ω ≡ (λ,µ).
2. Firms learn B and decide upon forming a cartel. If not, the game ends.
3. If a cartel is formed, ﬁrms learn θ and their identity (H or L).
4. Firms decide upon self-reporting and cartel continuation. The game
ends after self-reporting, after conviction without self-reporting, and
when ﬁrms decide not to continue the cartel. Otherwise Stage 4 repeats
itself.10
Note that all periods after ﬁrms have learned θ in stage 3 are identical such
that self-reporting or cartel termination will occur only in the ﬁrst period
after stage 3 or never. We will specify the social welfare function when we
turn to the authority’s optimal policy in stage 1. In the following we solve
the game via backwards induction for a subgame perfect equilibrium.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
3.1 Cartel Continuation
Let us ﬁrst consider the continuation payoﬀ in case ﬁrms do not self-report in
a given period. In the next round, each ﬁrm earns θB and has expected ﬁne
10Hence, we exclude the case that cartel activity continuous after (unsuccessful) self-
reporting or after conviction. This assumption seems reasonable as the risk of being
detected and convicted after the case has come to the authority’s attention is too high.
Relaxing this assumption would clearly reduce the overall social beneﬁt of the leniency
program, but leaves the structure of optimal ﬁne reductions unchanged.
8pGs. Since the probability to reach the next period is 1 − pG, the expected




δ(1 − pG)(θB − pGs)
1 − δ(1 − pG)
.
πF is identical for ﬁrm H and L as it captures the case without self-reporting.




The following table summarizes the payoﬀ matrix in case one or two ﬁrms
self-report (row player is ﬁrm H and column-player ﬁrm L; S denotes the
action ”self-report” and N ”no self-report”).
H/L S N
S −1
2 (rH + pCLs)/ −rH/ − pCHs
−1
2 (rL + pCHs)
N −pCLs/ − rL θB − pGs + max(πF,0)/
θB − pGs + max(πF,0)
Table 1: Payoﬀs with and without self-reporting
If no ﬁrm self-reports, it receives the beneﬁts θB and is convicted with prob-
ability pG. Afterwards, each ﬁrm gets the maximum from termination (i.e.
zero proﬁt) and continuation (i.e., πF)– max(πF,0). If only one ﬁrm self-
reports, it pays the reduced ﬁne rF whereas the respective co-cartelist is
convicted with pCF and pays s in this case. If both ﬁrms want to be the
ﬁrst one to come forward, each of them wins the race to the courtroom with
probability 1/2 which explains the payoﬀs in case both ﬁrms self-report.
Inspecting Table 1 yields the following insights:
Observation 1. 1. If θ ≥ θ ≡
pGs
B , then N ≡ (N,N) is a pure strategy
Nash-equilibrium of stage 3(PNE) in which ﬁrms continue the cartel. If
θ < θ and θ ≥ θ ≡
pGs−rH
B , N is a PNE, but ﬁrms terminate the cartel
after this period because they have learned that θ is too low. As rH ≤ rL,
ﬁrm H has a (weakly) lower incentive to stick to the N-equilibrium. It
receives a (weakly) lower ﬁne when it self-reports. In other words, ﬁrm
H is pivotal as for N being a PNE.
92. (S,N) or (N,S) can never be PNE as a necessary condition for an
asymmetric equilibrium is that the inequalities rH > pCLs and rH <
pGs − θB hold simultaneously. This, however, is impossible as θ ≥ 0
and pCL ≥ pG. Hence, if a ﬁrm anticipates that the partner self-reports,
it will always try to win the race to the courtroom.
3. S ≡ (S,S) is a PNE whenever rH ≤ pCLs and rL ≤ pCHs hold simul-
taneously.
From Observations (1) and (3), it follows that N and S may coexist as PNE.
Intuitively, this will be the case if the self-reporting ﬁnes are suﬃciently low
(this makes S a PNE) and when the cartel beneﬁt θB is suﬃciently high (this
makes N a PNE). To select among the (possibly) coexisting pure strategy
Nash-equilibria S and N, we apply pay-oﬀ dominance and ﬁnd
Lemma 1. Suppose ﬁrms have formed a cartel. Then, S is the pay-oﬀ dom-
inant PNE if and only if rH < pGs and θ < θ. Otherwise, N is the pay-oﬀ
dominant PNE.
Proof. All proofs can be found in the Appendix.
Comparing Lemma 1 to Observation 1 about the existence of a PNE without
self-reporting shows that the N-equilibrium is payoﬀ dominant whenever it
exists. The intuition is that N can only be an equilibrium if even the high
evidence provider (ﬁrm H) does not beneﬁt from being the only self-reporter.
But since being the only self-reporter leads to a higher payoﬀ than the one in
the S-equilibrium, N is preferred to S if it exists. In what follows, we assume
that ﬁrms play the pay-oﬀ dominant equilibrium. Hence the authority can
induce self-reporting only by destroying the N as an equilibrium.
3.3 Cartel Formation
Given the termination-, continuation- and self-reporting-decisions as derived













1 − δ(1 − pG)
(3)
11pC−F denotes the probability that ﬁrm F is convicted when the other ﬁrm (expressed
by ”−F”) self-reports.
10For θ < θ, N is no equilibrium such that we get a race to the courtroom. This
explains the ﬁrst term. For θ ≤ θ < θ, N is a (payoﬀ dominant) equilibrium
and hence played, but the cartel is terminated after the shock. Finally, for
θ ≥ θ, the cartel lasts unless it is detected.
Since ﬁrms assume to be ﬁrm H and ﬁrm L with equal probabilities, the




(ΠH + ΠL). (4)
Note that the cartel will be formed iﬀ Π ≥ 0. For any given policy Ω of
the authority, Π depends on B. For further reference, let us deﬁne e B as the





3.4 The Authority’s Optimal Policy
To derive the authority’s objective function, we need to specify the social
loss from cartel formation. For each cartel period, there is a reduction in
the sum of producers’ and consumers’ surplus denoted τ. Furthermore, let
us deﬁne γ(λ,µ) as the probability that a cartel is formed depending on the
authority’s policy Ω = (λ,µ). Making use of θ and θ, it follows immediately





















1 − δ(1 − pG)

. (5)
If a cartel is formed, it is self-reported with probability
R θ
0 dG(θ), such that
the social loss τ occurs only once. With probability
R θ
θ dG(θ), the cartel is
not self-reported but terminated, and again τ happens only once. Finally,
with probability
R 1
θ dG(θ), the cartel lasts until it is detected.
Note that neglecting the authority’s eﬀort costs in the social cost function
is without loss of generality. It is straightforward to assume that there are
some costs C(pG) arising in each period, and we could also allow for lower
eﬀort costs after a cartel has been detected once. In a working paper, we
11have analyzed an extended version where pG is endogenous, which did not
show any qualitative impact on our results.
The Authority minimizes SC by choosing λ and µ. We ﬁnd12
Proposition 1. (i) The optimal self-reporting ﬁne is always positive for at
least one ﬁrm: λ∗ > 0.
(ii) It is always optimal to diﬀerentiate between the two ﬁrms: µ∗ > 0.
(iii) The self-reporting ﬁne for the high evidence provider is always below the
expected ﬁne without self-reporting: r∗
H < pGs.
(iv) The self-reporting ﬁne for the low evidence provider is equal to the ex-
pected ﬁne when the high evidence provider self-reports: r∗
L = pCHs.
(v) The self-reporting ﬁne for the high evidence provider is positive (r∗
H > 0)
if G(θ) > g(θ)
(pCL+2pCH)s
B for θ =
pGs
B .
(vi) The self-reporting ﬁne for the high evidence provider is zero (r∗
H = 0) if







From a policy perspective, part (i) may be considered as our main result: it
says that it is never optimal to grant full immunity regardless of the amount
of evidence provided. The reason is that the low evidence provider should
always pay a positive ﬁne. To see this, recall that the high-evidence provider
is pivotal for the existence of an equilibrium without self-reporting. It follows
that, for any ﬁne for the high-evidence provider (and hence also for r∗
H = 0),
one can choose a higher ﬁne for the low-evidence provider without aﬀecting
the overall probability of self-reporting. And since this higher ﬁne for ﬁrm
L increases the overall expected ﬁne (and thereby deterrence), the result
follows. Part (ii) follows exactly the same logic.
Given parts (i) and (ii) of the Proposition, it is easy to make more precise
statements about the self-reporting ﬁnes for the two types. Part (iii) says
that it is always optimal to reduce the high-evidence provider’s ﬁne below
the punishment he would expect without self-reporting. This resembles well-
known results from the self-reporting literature and says that is optimal to
give incentives to come forward. Technically speaking, the reason is that
the marginal number of self-reporters is non-zero (due to the full-support
assumption of g(θ)) while the number of self-reporters obviously vanishes at
θ = 0. Hence, a marginal ﬁne reduction below pGs induces self-reporting and
thereby higher expected ﬁnes in the self-reporting equilibrium S but does not
reduce deterrence due to lower ﬁnes for self-reporters.
12Subgame perfect policy choices by the authority are denoted by ()∗.
12More interestingly, part (iv) says that the self-reporting ﬁne of the low-
evidence provider should equal the expected ﬁne he faces when his accomplice
self-reports. The only reason to reward the low-evidence provider at all is
to avoid destruction of the full self-reporting equilibrium S. Hence, ﬁrm L
pays the same expected ﬁne as without self-reporting (given that the high
evidence provider self-reports). Summing up, our results (i)-(iv) show that
the amount of evidence provided should play an important rule for the ﬁne
of the ﬁrst self-reporter (the winner of the race to the courtroom), and that
guaranteeing a ﬁne of zero is ineﬃcient.
Parts (v) and (vi) analyze whether full immunity should be granted for the
high-evidence provider. Here, the intuition is less straightforward than for
parts (i) to (iv). As we present in more detail in the proof of Proposition
1 (see Appendix), the impact of a ﬁne increase on social costs can be di-
vided into two contributions. ∂SC
∂rF > 0 displays marginal social beneﬁts of
a ﬁne increase – higher ﬁnes for those who self-report reduce cartel prof-
its and thereby enhance deterrence. In contrast, dSC
dθ
dθ
drH < 0 represents
marginal social costs of a ﬁne increase. For higher ﬁnes, ﬁrm H is less
tempted to self-report (and thereby to destroy N as an equilibrium) which
leads to higher cartel stability and thereby to higher expected cartel prof-
its and reduced deterrence. Marginal beneﬁts are proportional to G(θ) (the
number of self-reporters), while marginal costs are proportional to g(θ) (the
marginal number of self-reporters). Part (v) shows that positive ﬁnes for
ﬁrm H are optimal if the number of self-reporters in case of a full amnesty
(i.e. at θ =
pGs
B ) is suﬃciently large. Intuitively, the higher the number of
self-reporters, the more important is a higher ﬁne for those who self-report
compared to the respective increase in cartel stability. Analogously, part
(vi) shows that a full amnesty for the high-evidence provider is optimal if
the number of self-reporters for full immunity is suﬃciently low. This is the
case, for instance, if G(θ) is convex such that shocks are likely to be mild
and the option value of self-reporting is small.
4 Conclusion
One of the features in which (past and present) corporate leniency programs
diﬀer is whether the ﬁne reduction depends on the amount of evidence pro-
vided or whether full immunity is granted regardless of this evidence. We
have found that it is never optimal to grant full immunity to ﬁrms providing
13low evidence on other cartel members. Our result seems to be robust as it
is based on the insight that the high evidence provider will be pivotal for
whether cartel continuation is an equilibrium or not. It follows that ﬁnes for
low evidence providers can be positive at no cost since these ﬁnes have no
impact on the overall probability of self-reporting as long at hey are (weakly)
below the expected ﬁne in case the other ﬁrm self-reports. Self-reporting ﬁnes
for low-evidence providers should hence be based on the regulator’s estima-
tion of the evidence other ﬁrms have to oﬀer. Out result lends considerable
support to the old system in the European Union and hence argues that
following the US-procedure with respect to the independence of the amount
of evidence creates social costs not yet recognized in the literature. Whether
these additional costs of a leniency program with full amnesty are balanced
by the recognized beneﬁts with respect to transparency and predictability of
ﬁne reduction is beyond the scope of our paper but should be analyzed on
the basis of the history of cartel cases.
Even though we restrict our model to the case of two ﬁrms, our analysis
should have convinced the reader that it is straightforward to generalize our
ﬁndings to larger cartels. All that matters is the existence of a ”highest
evidence provider” who is pivotal for the destruction of an equilibrium in
which no ﬁrm self-reports. Keeping the ﬁne reduction for this ﬁrm ﬁxed, the
authority beneﬁts from higher ﬁnes for ﬁrms with lower evidence while the
number of self-reported cartels remains unaltered. This leads again to no ﬁne
reduction beyond expected ﬁnes without self-reporting for all but the highest
evidence provider. The optimal ﬁne reduction for the latter ﬁrm, however,
again depends on the distribution of cartel shocks.
In our analysis, we have conﬁned attention to one element of corporate le-
niency programs, the impact of the evidence provided. Other important
elements include (i) whether ﬁne reductions should also be granted for sub-
sequent self-reporters which is still possible under the new EU program but
not under the US program, and (ii) whether ﬁne reductions are sensible after
an investigation has started and when the authority has already collected
substantial evidence. Again, these ﬁne reductions are feasible under the EU
program, but not under the US legislation.
To analyze these questions, we have developed an extended model which al-
low for self-reporting before and after an investigation has started, and where
ﬁrms can self-report subsequently (see Feess and Walzl (2003)). Although
this leads inevitably to a more complex model, some clear-cut results can be
derived: First, we show that ﬁne reductions should also be granted to second
14self-reporters if conviction requires some investigation eﬀort. Second, in the
conviction stage (i.e. after the cartel has already been detected), both ﬁnes
should not depend on the own evidence provided, but only on the proba-
bility of being convicted by the partner’s testimony. Third, the ﬁne for the
low-evidence provider should be the same in both self-reporting stages, i.e.
independent of whether the case has already been detected or not.
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A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
1. Suppose either rH > pCLs or rL > pCHs. Then, N is the pay-oﬀ
dominant PNE - in fact it is the unique PNE of stage 3.
2. Suppose that θB > pGs. Then, N is the pay-oﬀ dominant PNE.
3. Suppose that θB < pGs, rH < pCLs, rL < pCHs, and θ < θ. Then,
S is the unique PNE. Recall that θ = 0 for rH ≥ pGs. Hence, it is
equivalent to say that S is the unique PNE if θB < pGs, rH < pGs and
θ < θ.
4. Suppose that θB < pGs, rH < pCLs, rL < pCHs, and θ > θ. Then,
both N and S are PNE. N, however, is payoﬀ-dominant if −1/2(rH(L)+





But as rH < pCLs, rL < pCHs, and rL ≥ rH, it follows that e θ < θ.
Therefore, if N is indeed a PNE (next to S) (a necessary condition
being θ > θ) it is also payoﬀ dominant (a suﬃcient condition being
θ > e θ.
Proof of Proposition 1 The authority chooses ω = (λ,µ) as to mini-







1−δ(1−pG)). The term in brackets is strictly positive and indepen-
dent of λ. Minimizing social costs is therefore equivalent to minimize cartel
frequency γ(λ,µ), i.e., the authorties objective is to minimize the ﬁrms ex-
pected beneﬁts from forming a cartel Π.
Part (i). Suppose λ∗ = 0 (and, hence, r∗
L = r∗
H = 0). Then, there is always a
e λ > 0 and a e µ = 1/pH such that rH = 0 and rL > 0. If the authority commits
to e λ and e µ, it yields rH = r∗
H and rL > r∗. Hence, θ =
pGs−rH
B (recall that
player H is pivotal for N to be an equilibrium as he has a higher incentive
to self-report because of rH < rL). Therefore, for (e λ, e µ) the same fraction of
cartels is self-reported as under (λ∗,µ∗) and player H faces the same expected
ﬁne in case of self-reporting (payoﬀs in N are not eﬀected at all). However,
player L faces a higher ﬁne if he successfully self-reports (rL > r∗) which
happens with probability 1/2 in S and therefore increases the total expected
ﬁne and thereby reduces Π. A contradiction to the optimality of (λ∗,µ∗).
Part(ii). By Part (i), λ∗ > 0. Now suppose that µ∗ = 0 such that r∗ ≡ r∗
H =
r∗
L = λ∗s > 0. By construction there is always a e λ > λ∗ and a e µ > 0 such
that e λ(1−e µpH)s = r∗. If the authority commits to e λ and e µ, it yields rH = r∗
and rL > r∗ (recall that pL < pH). Hence, θ =
pGs−rH
B (recall that player H is
pivotal for N to be an equilibrium as he has a higher incentive to self-report
because of rH < rL). Therefore, for (e λ, e µ) the same fraction of cartels is
self-reported as under (λ∗,µ∗) and player H faces the same expected ﬁne in
case of self-reporting (payoﬀs in N are not eﬀected at all). However, player
L faces a higher ﬁne if he successfully self-reports (rL > r∗) which happens
with probability 1/2 in S and therefore increases the total expected ﬁne and














4g(θ)(−rL + 3rH − pCLs − pCHs). Therefore, dΠ
drH|rH=pGs > 0 (recall that
θ|rH=pGs = 0).
Part(iv). By Part (iii), r∗
H < pGs. Then, G(θ) > 0 and dΠ
drL = −1
4G(θ) < 0












g(θ)(rL − 3rH + pCLs + pCHs) (6)
(see Part (iii)) and r∗
L = pCHs (see Part (iv)), it follows by Part (iii) that
the ﬁrst term in Eqn.(6) is strictly negative while the second term is strictly
18positive. If G(θ) > g(θ)
(pCL+2pCH)s
B in θ =
pGs




Part (vi). Observe that 1
Bg(θ)(pCLs + 2pCHs − 3rH) > 3g(θ)θ (recall that
pCF > pG). If G(θ) is strictly convex (i.e., G(θ) < θg(θ))), this implies that
dΠ
drH > 0 for all rH ∈ [0,pGs].
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